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Introduction: The Rise of ‘State Capture’ and Large 
Scale Corruption 
Large-scale and systemic state capture is at the root of widespread corruption and is 
gaining such proportion in Serbia that it threatens to undermine the success of its 
transition. The phenomenon of state capture has to be differentiated from the corrupt 
activities of giving and receiving bribery (“administrative corruption”) and is to be 
connected with the institutional and legal weaknesses of the social system. Recent 
literature defines state capture as the ‘seizure’ of laws to the advantage of corporate 
business via influential political links in parliament and the government. When the state 
is ‘captured’ in this manner, the whole legal system becomes the opposite of what it 
should be - it works to the advantage of illegal interests that are dressed up in a legal 
form.1 For the purpose if my policy paper, I have defined ‘state capture’ as any group or 
social strata, external to the state, that gains decisive influence over state institutions 
and policies for its own interests, and against the public good. I will show that, in Serbia, 
political parties are the main agents being used to appropriate the state and public 
assets. They are systematically expanding their political and financial power, influence 
and ability to give employment to relatives and party cronies and to promote the 
personal and corporate interests of the political and economic elite in control behind 
the scenes. The appropriation of state institutions and functions by the political party 
leadership is being done via the use of a variety of mechanisms, which I will explain 
using research data. How the citizens of Serbia perceive the roles of parties in state 
capture and corruption will be presented, too - using a survey of public opinion 
conducted specifically for this policy paper. I will conclude by presenting a list of 
policies that should be examined and resorted to, to reduce or neutralize the captured 
state phenomenon. 
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The Extent of the Problem 
During the first two transition years after the overthrow of Milosevic in 2000, political 
corruption in Serbia declined. The government was not a centre of corruption as was 
the case with the previous regime.2  When the first democratic Prime Minister was 
assassinated and his government3 was forced to resign under pressure from his 
political rivals (the same victorious coalition which took power in October 2000, against 
Milosevic, and which were backed by the “old forces”) state capture was renewed 
together with the rise of party influence over state institutions.4  After the December 
2003 elections and after a new government was created in March 2004, state capture 
began to reach alarming proportions – a trend that has continued for the last two and a 
half years. The degree of political corruption is corroborated by the World Bank report 
on patterns and trends regarding corruption in all transition countries for the 2002-2005 
period.5 Research shows that some transition countries have been able to have 
continued success in fighting corruption (Georgia, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria and 
Croatia made headway during these years with regard to all dimensions, while 
Moldova, Tajikistan, The Ukraine and Latvia made progress along some dimensions). 
On the other hand, some countries - including Serbia, Albania, the Kyrgyz Republic 
and Azerbaijan - saw an increase in corruption after 2002 with regard to relevant 
indicators. Serbia has seen both an increase in “petty” i.e. administrative corruption 
(bribery)6 and in the topic this paper deals with - state capture - which is qualified as 
“grand and systemic corruption”, something rooted in political corruption and the 
non-controlled powers of a political elite. With regard to higher levels of state capture, 
Serbia finds itself in the same group as Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina and the FYR of 
Macedonia.  
 Serbian citizens’ perceptions of corruption coincide with the WB research results 
and the TI CPI ranking. Survey data arrived at for this policy paper (see Annex I) shows 
that Serbia’s citizens think corruption is widespread and that it has increased in recent 
years.  When asked about amounts of corruption, only 3% of those polled think it is 
minor, 34% qualify it as considerable, while 53% perceive it as widespread. As many 
as 56% of respondents thought that corruption has risen in the last two years, while 
only 19% were of the view that it has decreased (while the rest had no opinion). 
Answers to the question of “During which government has corruption been greatest?” 
yielded similar percentages: 51% said it was no greater than in the Milosevic era, while 
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25% said it was at its highest level now. Only nine percent reckoned corruption was at 
its highest during the first post-Milosevic government (led by Prime Minister Djindjic), 
while 5% thought it was highest when Prime Minister Zivkovic led the same 
government after Djindjic’s assassination.7  
After the government transition, there was a change of priorities, leading to a more 
old-styled manner of governance, as expressed in political/party control of the police, 
the security intelligence agency, the media, and the judiciary; and there was a bringing 
back of old cadres to positions in state organs. Whereas the first Djindjic Government8 
ambitiously and enthusiastically concentrated on enabling Serbia to become 
integrated with the EU as soon as possible, enthusiasm for the EU integration process 
noticeably ebbed after the second government came to power. A rightist 
clerical-nationalist party has played the lead role in the coalition government set up in 
March 2004.9 Adverse to Western values, it has placed a commitment to EU 
integration on the back burner.10  
 The second transition government continued to pass a number of anti-corruption 
laws,11 thereby contributing to a trend towards an improvement of Serbia’s position as 
regards its TI rating score in the period 2003-2006  (before Serbia stopped being rated). 
The most-recent publication of the TI Corruption Perception Index (CPI), for 2006, 
shows that Serbia has slightly improved its position, going from a 97-103 ranking to a 
90-92 ranking (which it shares with Surinam and Gabon); and it has a CPI of 3.0 (it was 
2.7 for 2004 and 2.8 for 2005), among 163 countries. This grade is still very low and 
signifies endemic corruption (N.B. 5.0 means that corruption has been reduced to a 
somewhat bearable level). A comparison with ex-socialist countries shows that the 
best are Estonia with 6.7, Slovenia with 6.4 and Hungary with 5.2 - while Albania (2.6), 
Russia (2.5) and Belarus (2.1) have the worst positions. Serbia is in the bottom half of 
the 20 ex-socialist countries, holding 13th position on the list. Its grade is only slightly 
better than the worst and substantially worse (as compared with the best countries).  
 Although Kostunica’s government has passed a number of laws which have had 
some effect on the country’s rating, adequate institutional reforms have not been 
established to ensure accountability, transparency, the rule of law, public sector 
effectiveness and merit-based public office appointments. The implementation of 
some laws was postponed or was of no great consequence. Instead, the government 
has focused on reviving nationalist values and resolving the “Serbian national issue” 
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and has preserved the staff and corruptive institutional structures that better serve 
such objectives. State institution reforms for have been merely rhetorical; insufficient 
encouragement has been given to the competitiveness of the economic and political 
systems; new decrees have extended discretionary decision-making methods.12 
Privatization of the big public companies has not yet begun13. The effectiveness of 
regulatory institutions has been sabotaged, and implementation of the Law on Auditing 
State Institutions and the Ombudsperson Law has been delayed. The Anti-Corruption 
National Strategy passed in December 2005 still lacks an institutional framework; and 
specific action plans have not yet been drafted.  
 A weakening of a European orientation for Serbia is being accompanied by a 
rebuilding - by the political and business elite14  - of ’state capture’ mechanisms. These 
persons have been able to “seize control” of state institutions, exercise great influence 
and amass considerable wealth. The phenomenon of state capture is now responsible 
for large-scale corruption and has seriously jeopardized one’s being able to act in the 
public interest - and, thus, the transition process itself in Serbia.  Even though 
transition in the economic sphere, chiefly on a macroeconomic level, and as regards 
the privatisation process have continued, institution building for the political, judicial 
and administrative systems has been delayed, thereby creating this state capture 
opportunity.  
 The visible consequences of the deficiencies outlined above have been the 
continual and on-going corruption scandals that have been in the news in the past 
three years. All cases have been at a ministry level. The greatest number has been 
connected with the “finance party” (G17 Plus). Scandals have included: the 
privatization procedure as related to the National Savings Bank15; a bribery situation 
publicly known as the “Brief Case Affaire”, involving the vice governor of the National 
Bank of Serbia; gross manipulation of a mineral water company privatization; graft in 
army procurement and an unauthorized commitment to purchase a satellite to monitor 
security zones around Kosovo. Other cases of suspected corruption having the 
potential to cause million-dollar losses for society involve the importing of electricity 
(the owners of the import company are said, in public, to be the financial backers of the 
biggest political parties), the importation of petroleum from Syria and the buying of 
railway carriages without a tender or the use of correct procurement procedures. 16  
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 None of these affairs has been resolved by legal process - and the government 
has “reacted” with its silence. The president of the Anti-corruption Council of the 
Government of Serbia, the advisory body founded by the Djindjic government to deal 
with this problem, estimated recently that the level of corruption in Serbia is once again 
at the pre-October 5th level (when Milosevic was in power). She pointed out that during 
the last three years there has been no audited National Final Budget Statement. She 
warned the public that the National Investment Plan (NIP) launched by the Minister of 
Finance and supported by the Government was passed in a corrupt manner - without a 
law for its implementation or control - via avoiding legal procedures and by giving 
discretional decision-making to one specific group of ministers. And she has predicted 
that corruption in the country will rise notably if the NIP is implemented.  
 Recent events associated with the preparation and content of the new Constitution 
of Serbia and also to the related approval process confirm our initial hypothesis 
about ’state capture’, i.e. one captured by the political/party elite. In mid-September 
2006, leaders of the four biggest parties17 agreed, literally overnight,18 about their 
Proposal for a Constitution. Without a single day of public debate and solely based on 
the decisions of party leaders, Parliament passed the Proposal and called for a 
referendum of approval. Members of Parliament never received the Proposal nor did 
they have a chance to discuss it in session, when adopted. Citizens and their 
organizations did not have a chance to debate it either. Among items that reinforce 
state capture mechanisms being used by political parties concerning the Constitution, 
on is that MPs’ mandates belong to the parties. In Article 102 it is stated that “the MP is 
free to (…) irrevocably put his mandate at the disposal of the party on whose list he 
was elected MP”.19 In addition, MPs’ immunity rights have been broadened. These 
changes will strengthen the political powers of the party elite and its interests (i.e. 
executive power) and additionally degrade Parliament and MPs’ responsibilities as 
regards constituents’ interests by re-confirming their impunity. The public has given the 
new Constitution the name “The Functionary’s Constitution”. The legitimacy of the 
Constitution was soon demonstrated when the Basic Law on Implementation of the 
Constitution was on Parliament’s agenda. The parties made a “deal” that they would 
vote for the Law only if, during the first session of the new Parliament (after the January 
elections), the heads of two independent institutions were replaced: the Governor of 
the National Bank of Serbia and the Ombudsman for Information. 20 
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 The new Constitution will not help curb ‘state capture’ or deal with damaging 
consequences; neither will it make the political leadership accountable to the public. 
Even worse, judicial independence is not guaranteed, via a preventing of party/political 
influence over the courts, the police and public prosecution. Getting to the roots of 
corrupt practices in governance is crucial when it comes to Serbia’s ability to break the 
grip of rigid institutional structures constructed to protect vested interests - so that it 
might then proceed successfully with regard to the European Union enlargement 
process. Yet these two, clear mandates in the new Constitution will make it difficult to 
eliminate parties use of public office for their private interests (i.e. rather than for 
representing constituents’ interests and pursuing the common good.)21  
 
  1. The Model of State Capture in Serbia, and its 
Mechanisms 
From the point of view of systems theory, state capture is caused by weak functional 
differentiation within the social system. Boundaries between sub-systems do not exist 
or are porous. Power and goods from the economic sub-system are convertible into 
influence and goods in the political sub-system - and vice versa, depending on where 
dominant power in the social system lies. The most dominant power in Serbia is still 
located within the political system.  
 The most important ’capturing’ agents are the political party leaderships, who have 
seized huge amounts of state property, including public companies, public offices and 
institutions, for their own interests. The second important type of agent is the country’s 
10-15 richest tycoons, who finance all relevant parties, thereby becoming part of the 
system.22 And both elites, in collusion with each other, have established a system of 
integrating influences, interests and services, for their mutual gain. This collusion has 
created an oligarchic social structure in Serbia that has undermined effective 
institution-building and the rule of law. 
The main chains of influence and interest connections are demonstrated below 
(Picture1).  
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Picture 1:  Model of State Capture in Serbia 
 
 
 
Picture 1 (above) displays the mutual dependences existing between the political 
and business elites and shows how tycoons help sustain their political positions by 
financing all relevant parties; in return, the ruling parties look after economic markets 
fix tenders and auctions, and pass legislation that is favorable to such tycoons. The 
illustration also shows how Government, Parliament and Parties are connected with 
public companies and public institutions, with these having their own ‘shares’ of power. 
The (black) links going from the government to the parties show that the position of the 
ruling parties in the described context does have a feedback effect regarding parties, 
for it makes their decision-making more centralized and oligarchic, and located, in 
practice, in the hands of the party’s president. 
The Mechanisms Used 
The following analysis will concentrate on ’state capture’ as a specific process in which 
political elites gain control of public offices, enterprises, utilities, and resources through 
a mingling of state, political party and economic power. Emphasis is placed on the 
concrete mechanisms showing how political parties impose their own will over public 
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interests, for their own benefit, how these mechanisms are incorporated within a 
multi-party system, and how this party-state amalgamation came to be achieved. 
 
I have highlighted the following six, interconnected state capture mechanisms: 
• Division of the government and the entire public sector into a feudal-type system 
whereby each party in the ruling coalition is given control over the portion it 
receives (based roughly on the number of MPs it has in parliament), as if it had its 
own private fiefdom. 23 The “vertical partition” of Government (as referred to in 
public) has done away with the political control abilities of coalition partners. 
• Connected with the first, the second mechanism entails appointing leading party 
officials (presidents, their deputies, etc) to manage the ’fiefdoms’ even though 
they are, simultaneously, actively working for their party offices. Because the 
party leader/feudal lord has Parliamentary MPs giving a majority of support to the 
government, corruption is, in practice, incorporated into the manner in which the 
government actually operates.24 If a minister were to be dismissed for corruption, 
he would withdraw his MPs, and the government would lose its parliamentary 
majority and thus fall.  
• A degrading of the Parliament and the mechanism used for bribing MPs, thus 
ensuring their loyalty. Obedience is obtained by offering MPs multiple 
functions/job postings, such as their being appointed to the managing boards of 
public companies or being given executive functions in local or regional 
government, thereby enabling such persons to get their hands on several 
sources of income.   
• Parties in the ruling coalition have the exclusive ’right’ to make appointments in 
state administration, public companies, utilities, institutes, agencies, 
funds, health, social and cultural centres, dormitories, veterinary surgeries, 
schools, theatres, hospitals, libraries, monuments and memorial park 
maintenance services – all of which belong to the public and are supported via 
the public budget. Management positions are not advertised, neither are they 
based on merit, which fact additionally harms the public interest and leads to 
widespread discrimination among citizens on the basis of party affiliation. 25 
• The relationship between parties (government) and business is not regulated in a 
transparent manner because the Law on the Funding of Political Parties, passed 
in 2003, is deficient in its controlling mechanisms, so was neither strictly nor 
effectively implemented in practice. The effectiveness of this law is the same as 
that of other, similar laws for which some “political will” would be needed. There is 
a tacit agreement between the parties not to implement the law strictly.26 As a 
result, corruption in this area has not diminished – and the parties themselves 
have remained centres of corruption.  
• Political influence over the judicial system is excessive, and there is a lack of 
checks and balances existing between the three main state power blocks. The 
executive branch (which again represents party influence) has gained control of 
the Parliament, the courts and public prosecution. This key mechanism is an 
extensive and diversified, and also separate topic, one that needs to be 
investigated in-depth independently - so it will not therefore be a part of this 
research. 
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 2. How the Government Functions as a 
Confederation of Party “Fiefdoms“  
The party feudal system at the national level will be analyzed via my giving information 
related to the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Education and Sport. I will then 
describe how the “party state” functions at the local level by presenting the case of Novi 
Sad, the third largest city in Serbia and the capital of the Vojvodina province.  
 
The Feudal/Party System at the National Level: The Case of the Ministry of Finance 
and the Ministry of Education and Sport 
 
 
 
At present, in Serbia, the ruling coalition comprises four parties,28 so the distribution 
of ’fiefdoms’ is as follows: 
 
The Political System and what the Parties in the Ruling Coalitions Own.  
Serbia has adopted a parliamentary political system. The party (or coalition of parties) that gets a 
majority of MPs in Parliament (250 seats) elects the Government as an executive state organ. The 
Government now has 19 ministries, but the number is changeable (each government decides about 
the number of ministries). It has the President of the Government (Prime Minister). The number of 
MPs of a particular party that are elected, if the party is a member of the government ruling coalition, 
defines the proportion the party will receive of the ministries and all other positions in the public 
enterprises (there are 17 public companies founded by the Government), institutions, agencies, 
foundations and services which are under the jurisdiction of the Government. Many positions are 
under the jurisdiction of each Minister. Since Serbia is a highly-centralized country, one Minister, for 
example, the Minister of Education and Sport has the authority to appoint more than 3000 directors of 
primary schools, and about 400 directors of secondary schools in Serbia27 (schools in Vojvodina are 
not under the Serbian Ministry). The Minister of Health has similar appointment authority, appointing 
directors for the hospitals, health centress, and other health institutions founded by the Government 
etc. In addition to the appointments at the National level, there are a huge number of appointments in 
the public sector at the local level (governments, public companies, services and institutions which 
are under the jurisdiction of the autonomous provinces (Vojvodina and partly Kosovo), cities, and 
municipalities. Appointments in the provinces, cities and municipalities (there are about 160 
municipalities) belong to the parties’ coalitions at that level. Proportions vary from one city or 
municipality to another.  It is estimated that the magnitude of power in the hands of the 
government/parties amounts to 40,000 appointments counting all levels - national, provincial, city 
and municipality. 
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Party MPs Ministries Quotas in Public 
Companies 
(management 
positions) 
DPS 53 10 (11) 50% 
G17+ 34 4 (3) 30% 
SRM-NS 22 5 20% 
SPS 20 - Quota of DPS 
 
The coalition agreement will lay down the ‘percentages of public office’ that each 
ruling party can get in accordance with the number of seats it won in Parliament. The 
second part of the agreement has had a direct effect upon the growth of corruption in 
the last three years, though such a factor was not present in the first post-Milosevic 
government29. It focuses on content, and classifies all offices by portfolio (horizontally 
and vertically). State capture and monopoly constitute part of the division – each 
coalition party receives a number of related portfolios to manage and provide staff by 
itself. Power is thus feudalized – each ruling party is the absolute ruler of its 
own ’fiefdom’. The government now operates as a confederation of ’power fiefdoms’ 
therefore. This “holistic” division of power among the ruling parties has led to 
non-accountable government; individual ministers have become more powerful and 
with broader authority and functions; government does not function as a team, and the 
prime minister does not take responsibility for government as a whole or for its 
ministries (as was the case in the first government). 
How the ‘Feudal System’ Functions in Practice 
The strongest party (the DPS - with 53 MPs) controls 10 ministries (plus the Ministry of 
Defence, after the dissolution of Serbia and Montenegro). This party exclusively 
controls appointments in the two most powerful “institutions of authority“: Internal 
Affairs (the Ministry of Police and the Intelligence Agency) and Economic Affairs (two 
ministries: one for the internal economy and the other for International Economic 
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Relations). In the same manner, this party holds the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of 
Science, the Ministry of Education and Sport, the Ministry of State Administration and 
Local Self-Management, the Ministry for Religion and the Ministry of Energy. As the 
strongest party, the DPS manages the largest (mainly monopoly) companies, like 
Telecom (and the telecommunications system), PTT (the Post Office, Telegraph and 
Telephone Company), “Galenika“ (the biggest pharmaceutical company, whose 
director is vice-president of the DPS), Yugo-Import (an arms-trading company), etc. 
G17+ exclusively controls the Ministry of Finance, the National Bank of Serbia, and 
all financial institutions and money circulation. It controls the Ministries of Health and 
Agriculture as well. Both ministries have major (vertical) control of local appointments 
throughout Serbia, including those for the big monopoly company Srbija Sume 
(Serbian Forests), which is often described as a “state within a state“.  The SRM-NS 
coalition30 has been allocated the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and also Capital 
Investments as their most important ‘fiefdoms’. They have three more ministries: the 
Ministry for Diaspora, the Ministry of Culture and the Ministry of Commerce & Tourism. 
The NS (New Serbia) controls Serbia’s railways and Postal Savings; while the SRM 
controls Yugoslav Air Transportation (JAT). 
The “confederation of fiefdoms“ of the interior, economy and finance (where power 
lies) is, in fact, an exchange system for services and interests that serves the interests 
of the parties in the coalition (and their hidden financiers) on the basis of mutual 
blackmailing – this being the withdrawing of MPs from Parliament if a Minister (i.e. 
president of the Party) were to be denounced for corruption. This system serves to 
corrupt key state institutions: the police, intelligence31, the judiciary, financial and 
economic institutions, health care and national budget expenditure. The system also 
puts different ministries into the hands of one party in order to strengthen their power. 
For example, the Ministry of Agriculture received new authority to deliver credits 
directly to farmers without any transparent procedure being related to this; then, it got 
from the Minister of Finance (at the time vice-President of G17+) a tenfold bigger 
budget than this Ministry had had before. In this way it got huge discretional authority - 
which was denounced in public of course - to be used to buy political support and 
votes.32 In conclusion, it is not an exaggeration to say that the ‘feudalized government’ 
has ‘integrated itself’ via the use of its own corruption. 
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The Case of the Ministry of Finance 
To demonstrate the very peculiar structure of the Government of Serbia, i.e. which I 
have described as a confederation of ’power fiefdoms’, I shall take a look at the 
Ministry of Finance and public financial institutions. G17+ has been allocated all forms 
of portfolio regarding finance. Its leader is the Finance Minister (He is the active 
President of G17+), and he has appointed “reliable“ associates and party cronies to 
posts below him. The same party has control over central financial institutions and 
services. Primary among these is the National Bank of Serbia – even though it should 
have independent status! The party also controls other independent institutions, such 
as the Commercial Bank, the Securities Commission, State Statistics etc.; while the 
executive departments under the Ministry are, for example, the Tax Administration, 
Customs Administration, the Lottery, etc. (Picture 2). About 90 per cent of all positions’ 
appointees come via party criteria and they are members of G17+. 33 
 
Picture 2:  Tree illustrating G17+’ Fiefdoms Picture – Tobacco, Director of 
Securities, Lottery, Treasury 
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Serbian Statistics 
The striking fact here is that institutions like the tax and customs administrations, the 
National Bank of Serbia34, Securities Commission, State Statistics, and other 
institutions that should be independent of political influence have become interwoven 
or tied up with party function(arie)s35.  The lack of transparency in the recruitment 
process for government and state institution positions – or in the way party/state 
functions are fused at the central level - has severely damaged government 
accountability.   
Apart from horizontal (at a national level) party rule, this party also rules vertically 
by appointing the heads of local tax administrations, customs boards and other local 
administration units.  Procedures regarding local appointments include proposals 
emanating from local party units.  Employment opportunities as regards the heads of 
local tax administrations, customs, etc. are not publicly advertised or discussed 
officially; local party boards recruit local administration heads throughout Serbia.36 
Chosen candidates are sent to the Minister for approval. About 90% of director 
appointments at the local level for tax or customs office are from the ranks of G17+.  In 
practice, horizontally and vertically all branches of finance and money circulation come 
under the control of one party, without there being any internal or external control, nor 
competition when it comes to appointments. Thus, two hierarchies – the party and the 
state - have overlapped! And this is how the closed, ’fiefdom’ system of authority 
works.   
The Case of the Ministry of Education and Sport (MES) 
The following makes a comparison between the first and second post-Milosevic 
governments as related to party membership within the Ministry; and it looks at the 
appointed Heads of County Education Departments and also at institutional 
appointments and ones made for companies/commissions dealing with education in 
Serbia. Thus, it reveals the degree to which professionalization has been replaced by 
the party system in this Ministry:  
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Party Membership of the Ministry in the First and Second Governments: 
Positions Government I  Government II  
Minister CAS DPS 
Vice-Minister DP DPS 
Deputy Minister Non- party DPS 
Deputy Minister Non- party DPS 
Deputy Minister Non- party DPS coalition party 
Deputy Minister CAS Unknown 
 
Composition of the Heads of County Educational Departments, by party affiliation: 
 Counties 
2000/ Minister/ CAS37 
Heads 
2004/ Minster/ DPS 
Heads 
Sombor Non-party DPS 
Zrenjanin -||- DPS 
Novi Sad -||- DPS 
Pozarevac CAS DPS 
Valjevo DP DPS 
Kragujevac Non-party DPS 
Nis CAS DPS 
Zajecar DC DPS 
Leskovac Non-party DPS 
Beograd CAS DPS 
Kosovo-Ranilug Previous DPS 
Kosovka Mitrovica -||- Previous 
Cacak - DPS 
Krusevac - DPS 
 
When the new government came into power, the Heads of County Education 
Departments appointed in 2000 were all dismissed (except for one, in Kosovo); the 
turnover for this middle-ranking position was one hundred per cent! All new 
appointments came via the dominant party for this party fiefdom (the Minister’s Party is 
the Democratic Party of Serbia - DPS). Since persons’ professional reputations were 
much lower, such a turnover meant that more-qualified people were being replaced 
with less-professional administrators. This change reflected changes in the Ministry 
itself: the best experts available in Serbia were taken on as leaders of educational 
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reform in the first government - yet they were all then thrown out to give places to 
“reliable“ people from the new, dominant party.  
 The same type of one-party control criteria can be found in all other educational 
institutions: The Centers as well as semi-independent institutions (founded by the 
Ministry) devoted to the development and evaluation of the quality of education, the 
professional training of teachers, etc. were reorganized. The directors of the Centers 
(experts and non-party people) were dismissed and replaced with less qualified people 
from the DPS.38 Public companies founded by the Ministry - such as the very profitable 
Text Book Publishing Company - were given to the DPS.  
 The same party (DPS) got the position of President of the Commission for 
Education in the Parliament.  Further down this hierarchy, i.e. going down to the 
directors of schools, official procedure theoretically empowers schools boards, 
composed of 9 people (3 parents, 3 school employees, and 3 from local government), 
to elect an administrator - and then send the chosen candidate to be approved by the 
Minister. But, in practice, this is not so, because the three people from local 
government - who are also from the party – just impose the selection of a school 
director in many cases.39 The forging of party criteria for the appointing of directors of 
primary and secondary schools all over Serbia has led to numerous public conflicts 
between the Minister and schools, with the latter not wishing to accept non-qualified 
directors who have been forced upon them. Only when schools threatened to go on 
strike owing to the political appointments coming from the Ministry were they able to 
win the battle for more qualified and professional directors of schools.40  
 The analyzed pattern of “party recruitments” does solely pertain to the Mininstry of 
Education or the Finance Ministry. Upon investigating the individual appointments of 
directors at a local level - in schools, libraries, cultural centres etc. - and noting the 
number that were appointed by the central government, it was evident that non-party 
candidates have had almost no chance of getting a director’s position in a local-level 
institution41. An analysis of some individual cases has shown that at the very moment 
when one party is “conquering” a ministry, local party functionaries start insisting, to 
party headquarters, that they get the leading position against other candidates in the 
competition. The party administration then prepares the case for the Presidency of the 
Party so that to its ministers can be influenced to appoint “our people”.  
The described and widespread practice to give almost full benefits to a “party 
candidate” has set on the margins both fair competition and professionalism when it 
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comes to management positions. By preventing competition and weakening degrees 
of professionalism, corruption has become protected within the political/party hierarchy, 
for it has been influenced from top government positions. And, unfortunately, this is a 
general rule, one that is being used by/in all ministries and middle administration 
positions in county institutions and companies, right down to local level office.42  
Public Companies43 
Privatization in Serbia is only half finished. In total, about 50 percent of companies are 
still owned by the state or are a mixture of state, “social” and private property. When 
taken together, 40 percent of the total workforce lives in the unreformed economy.  
 The most important aspect of state capture is the ‘seizure’ of public companies; 
and parties in the ruling coalition manage these exclusively. Public property has 
thereby effectively been converted into “party property”, and is managed in its interests. 
And a huge amount of assets has been captured. The 17 biggest companies founded 
by the government of Serbia are managed by the parties that comprise the ruling 
coalition at the National level: management boards and persons who might be 
presidents and directors are sought out - and, via a quota system, such positions are 
then divided up among each of the ruling coalition parties, who will then make 
appointments to such management positions as if the companies were their own 
property. All other public companies – about 500 – are in the hands of the ruling 
coalitions at a local level (see box below44).  
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There are many indicators that management-hiring decisions in public companies 
are not based on criteria of merit, experience or qualifications; nor are managers held 
responsible for any failures during the time of their tenure. If the government wants to 
keep prices low (thereby producing losses) the party-appointed managers must 
comply. This is the case with electricity prices, which are lower than in the rest of the 
region. The justification for controlling electricity prices (or other ones) is the 
socially-based argument of needing to subsidize the salaries of the population, which 
are generally low; it also serves to show that inflation is (nominally) lower; though the 
low prices have also given substantial benefits to the private interests of party-related 
firms that have a business selling electricity abroad. Such discretional decisions made 
about public company prices can bring enormous profit to the tycoons who finance 
ruling coalition parties.  
Since public companies are the political-power stronghold of the ruling parties, they 
are used in many different ways. Benefits for the party include companies being used 
for the employment of party members and for rewarding party functionaries for their 
‘loyalty’ with the extra incomes coming from directorships. Parties may also get free, 
direct services, such as publicity for their campaigns and the publishing of journals and 
advertising materials, the delivery of gifts to socially deprived persons in the name of 
the party, etc. They even serve to control the media: the biggest public company, 
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Serbia’s Electro-distribution, owns 14 percent of the shares of the daily newspaper 
Politika, and makes use of public money to keep government control over the news 
media.45 The Government has direct control over the public company Radio-TV of 
Serbia (RTS), even though it is supposed to be an independent information-giving 
public service46. In a somewhat different way, the Government controls Vecernje 
Novosti, the most popular daily – for it once prevented an independent person from 
getting a majority stake; instead, it was sold to tycoons close to the government and its 
ruling parties. On the local level, ruling parties control the public media. The most 
recent big case was the dismissing of the editorial board of the weekly papers in 
Zrenjanin – which was done by Kostunica’s DPS, which had gained control of the 
municipality47.  
 The ‘right’ to appoint directors as well as to actually manage affairs is not subject to 
any public control regarding the use of resources or salaries for the management 
board. Nor is there any independent external auditing of the real situation in a company. 
When asked about the salaries of top management, the directors of public companies 
chose not to answer, saying that it was a “secret”.48 Detailed research on salaries in 
public companies shows that the average incomes of employees are not significantly 
higher than in other enterprises. Incomes are, however, much higher for top 
management board members - who, in individual cases, receive more than 500.000 
dinars per month (6 thousand euros, in a country where the average salary is 200 -250 
euros). Incomes for the members of managing boards vary from company to company, 
yet they can be two or three times the average managerial salary. The actual benefit is 
even greater, though - for it is not merely a job but a position that can be held in 
addition to other regular jobs or positions.  
Party-nominated management boards are not there to control and supervise the 
business of the company or to work in the public interest – instead, they are there to 
“close their eyes” when their own or their party’s interests are at stake. Public 
companies are a nest of corruption and cause a loss of public money, a phenomenon 
that can be changed only via a process of privatization, it would seem. The IMF 
suggests that real reforms will start when public companies (so often monopolies) 
open themselves to an adequately designed and controlled privatization procedure49. 
Only then will real reforms in Serbia be able to take place.  
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The Local Level: The Case of the City of Novi Sad 
The city of Novi Sad has been chosen as a case study to demonstrate the link between 
party privileges and the executive employment turnover within municipalities and their 
public companies, utilities and services. This city gives a clear example of party shifts 
after local elections occur, as the Serbian Radical Party (SPR) won the last elections, 
in 2004 (with two coalition partners: the Socialist Party of Serbia and the DPS), after 
the Democratic Party (DP) with its coalition partners had dominated the city for 8 years. 
Radicals got 35 elected members in the City Assembly and, with their partners, had a 
majority of 42 representatives (out of 78 assembly members).  
 State capture of all positions in public offices is the model operating at a local level 
as well as at a national one – though on a local level it is more easy to see how elected 
people get hold of jobs in public companies and how nepotism operates along with 
forms of cronyism.   
 The Structure of the City Authority 
Government/Secretariats City Council 2004-* City Council 2000-2004 
Mayor (directly elected) SRP LSV50 
City Architect/Urbanism Quota of SRP LSV 
City manager SRP - 
Budget and finance SRP DP 
Communal activities SRP DP 
Transportation SRP LSV 
Social protection SRP CAS 
Sport SRP DP 
Environment SRP - 
Culture SRP LSV 
Education SPS Reform Party/Vojvodina 
Economy SPS RP/Vojvodina 
Administration and legal affairs SPS DP 
Health DPS CAS 
Information - Social democratic party (SDP) 
 
The table shows the government structure in relation to the party-related 
distribution of “ministries” and to positions in local government. It shows that there was 
a 100% turnover after the local elections; i.e. one party (or coalition) enters the local 
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government and takes over all public positions – and after the follow-up election, 
another one comes along to take over their positions. This clearly shows that no 
degree of job-related professionalism will be needed.  
 Costs, here, in terms of managerial capacity are enormous. As soon as one group 
of managers gets the knowledge and experience to lead health or education, for 
example, it may soon be thrown out and replaced after subsequent elections. 
Hundreds of people who were given such appointments by the Democratic Party 
before the last elections had to then find another job51 - and it will be the same with 
Radicals when they lose an election and a new coalition comes into power in Novi Sad. 
Investments in the training of local government cadres are wasted if they do not 
establish professionalism and related criteria within local institutions. Since local 
government and services are closest to the needs of the citizen, the practice of totally 
politicizing local operations damages the public interest - as if local governments 
existed only to employ party cronies, families and their friends.  
 The “turnover” of power is used in several different ways for the benefit of party 
cronies, families and friends – and against citizens and the public interest:  
• To obtain leading positions in public companies. Of the 42 members of the 
Assembly who were elected, 24 got jobs in public companies in a position of 
director or in a professional post. Three members of the City Assembly elected 
from the DP list left their party and joined the Radicals’ majority for family reasons 
(i.e. to protect their husbands from losing directorship positions gained in the 
previous distribution of management positions in public companies). 
• More than 1000 people got jobs in the city administration and public companies 
without there being any public advertisements or competition forthcoming. During 
the first 13 months of the Radicals’ rule, 965 people from their party were 
employed in public companies and related utilities (while the DP employed 654 
people during the 8 years of their rule). Many such positions were based on 
nepotism (family and friendship ties), which of course gave rise to numerous 
public scandals. The mayor of Novi Sad reacted to nepotism scandals by 
delivering a special announcement, namely that she is “against nepotism and any 
conflict of interests”, and she requested that appointees “display public 
awareness and give up positions obtained in this immoral way”.  Yet nothing 
changed, for all the “immoral positions” have remained in the hands of family 
members, party cronies and friends.  
• More than 30 people without having the required educational qualifications but 
solely via family and party ties obtained jobs in the city administration, in leading 
positions; such jobs were in public companies/utilities (there are 15 such public 
companies in the city, in the hands of the ruling coalition) or in institutions of 
culture, dealing with urbanization, museums, school boards, etc.  
• The Radicals and their coalition partners (DPS and SPS) who ‘divided up’ the 
public companies have ignored previous practice: that the president of the 
VESNA PESIC: STATE CAPTURE AS THE CAUSE OF WIDESPREAD CORRUPTION 
 25
managing boards of public companies (and institutions) and the president of 
monitoring boards must be from different parties. This practice had enabled some 
elementary internal control to be established – now, however, both the president 
of a managing board and the presidents of the monitoring bodies are from the 
same party.  
• The dramatic lowering of the qualifications of appointees in the local government 
and companies has led to huge losses which have to be covered by the city 
budget (i.e. money gained from taxpayers). The financial reports of city 
companies have shown that they have been making less and less profit. The city 
transportation company has had a five times bigger loss (deficit) than it had in 
2004 (when the Radicals came to power), while the biggest company (The Sport 
Centres of Novi Sad – SPENS) has suffered losses for the first time in its history. 
The City Assembly then passed a budget revision by which an additional 750 
million dinars in subsidies was approved to finance city companies. This means 
that more than half of the city budget is being used to support or shore up public 
companies. 
• The salaries of public company directors have gone up to such an extent that 44 
of the directors of the public companies/institutions (as well as their advisors and 
deputies) were on the list of Novi Sad’s millionaires. The Director of the Public 
Transport Company, which has had the biggest deficit, has the largest salary! 
The second on this list is the Director of the Institute for Building in Novi Sad; 
while third is the Director of the Business Premises Areas (and so on). All 
directors bearing the greatest salaries are high functionaries of the SRP, and 
some of them are also members of the National Parliament.   
 
In conclusion, data for the City of Novi Sad has demonstrated that state capture 
and its feudal mechanisms, something instigated by the ruling parties, operates on a 
local level in an even more visible and blatant way; and this has severely corrupted the 
public sector at the expense of citizens and the public interest. 
 
 3. Degradation of the Serbian Parliament and the 
Multiple Functions of MPs 52  
Serbia has a proportional representation electoral system: the whole country is one 
electoral unit, and each competing party puts forth its list of candidates for the 250 
seats in the Parliament. This electoral system usually produces coalition governments 
because no single party is able to gain a majority. The parties’ top leaderships (mainly 
the president of the party) have been able to take control of Parliamentary seats, first 
by composing the candidate lists and then by deciding which candidates will enter 
Parliament after the elections, regardless of their ranking on the list. Arbitrary selection 
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of who will go into parliament is a relevant corruptive mechanism associated with state 
capture, yet electoral law allows it.  Then, the persons chosen to enter Parliament are 
obliged to sign blank resignations prior to their entering, this being is an illegal 
‘invention’ of parties. These blank resignations are kept by the party leader, who will 
make use of them if needed. If an MP is disloyal or does not vote as instructed (and this 
is especially true for ruling party MPs), s/he is stripped of his/her mandate and is 
thrown out of Parliament. This illegal practice was introduced by Kostunica’s minority 
government;53 and it was illegal because (on May 27, 2003) the Constitutional Court 
(responding to the complaint of Kostunica’s Democratic party of Serbia, which was 
stripped of all mandates) decided that the mandate belongs to an individual MP, thus 
establishing the “independent mandate”  principle. This decision limited the power of 
the party, though it opened up the opportunity for the misuse of mandates (e.g. with 
persons “selling mandates” – where mandates were bought, when needed, either to 
keep the government’s majority or by the opposition to try to overthrow the 
government). Not all cases of “disobedience” fell into this category54, but the illegal 
expulsion of MPs became the “method” used by the government to protect its majority 
and Parliament’s composition. The “method” was implemented via the Administrative 
Board of the Parliament, which is made up of ruling parties’ representatives.55  
In trying to eliminate corruptive mechanisms in the Serbian Parliament, the 
Venetian Commission on Serbian Electoral Legislation suggested that electoral 
legislation in Serbia needs to be changed to make it clear that (a) mandates belong to 
individual MPs, and (b) parties and coalitions must announce in advance the numerical 
ordering of the candidates who will enter Parliament from the lists - instead of being 
allowed to choose after the elections which candidates will actually get a mandate. 
Under current practices, citizens never know who they are voting for. Yet instead of 
enacting the suggested Electoral Legislation-type reforms, the new Constitution - one 
created by the agreement of the four leaders of the parties - clearly states that the 
mandates belong to the parties. And ratification of the new Constitution made it more 
difficult to eliminate corruptive mechanisms from Parliament.  
To cement their obedience, MPs are corrupted by being given money for trips they 
have never made and for attending Parliamentary committee sessions they never went 
to. Although the main bribery mechanism lies in the opportunity of an MP to 
accumulate offices: MPs can simultaneously be mayors of cities (or municipalities), 
president of the regional government56, or a member of local government (“council”), 
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while also being on the managing boards of funds or agencies; they can be elected as 
assembly members at all other local levels (city and provincial). They can be business 
advisers, city land bureau directors and members of management boards, and/or 
presidents or directors of public companies. The only limitation for an MP here, as 
imposed by the Law on Conflicts of Interest (passed in April, 2004), is that they may not 
have a managerial position in more than one public company at the same time.  By the 
same law, MPs explicitly have the right “to keep their managing rights in other business 
enterprises if this does not influence their public functioning or their impartial and 
independent performance”.  
Holding multiple functions allows MPs to have several sources of income (see 
Chart 1). It is shown in Chart 1 that 61% of MPs have other functions, of which 44% 
have one extra function and 17% have two or more. Getting the most lucrative post in a 
public company is possible only by a decision being made to this effect by the party 
president. This gives the party presidents great power by allowing them to bestow 
‘rewards’ upon party functionaries. The richer the public company one gets, the more 
he/she will gain by having a place on the board of management. 
 
Chart 1: MPs multi-functions  - Total MPs=246  
  
Chart 2: MPs multi-functions by content - Total MPs=246 
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I have identified 23 individual MPs who have 4 public functions; 17 mayors of the 
cities are MPs57. When some party leaders were interviewed about the reasons for the 
accumulation of functions, the answer was that the mayors of cities and municipalities, 
and the directors of city land bureaus and other institutions want to be MPs for the 
immunity they enjoy. Another reason for function accumulation in few hands only 
comes from the oligarchic structure of the parties: it is easier to control a small number 
of people than a wider group with a dispersion of functions. Some MPs hold all types of 
representative role (in cities and provinces) below the National Parliament level. Being 
liberated from the restrictions of the Law on the Conflict of Interests (something 
overseen by their parties) and enjoying a widely-defined immunity, such MPs can 
ensure ‘state capture ’ in a literal sense - as the ‘seizure’ of laws to the advantage of 
corporate business via influential political links with Parliament. That is, they have the 
privilege of being “legally bribed”.  
Regulations on conflicts of interest serve to set standards as regards public office 
performance, thereby building citizen confidence in state institutions and preventing 
multiple functions and the resultant corruption. In essence, these regulations put limits 
on the accumulation of functions by public officials (which, as said, always leads to a 
concentration of power in society and a degrading of the public interest). If public 
officials have many public roles, they cannot comply with the real requirements of any 
of the roles, however - thus damaging the public interest. 
 
The Law on the Conflict of Interests passed in Serbia has not met public 
expectations for the following main reasons:  
• Many public functions were not covered by this law, including the roles most likely 
to be exposed to corruption, such as positions in the courts, prosecution offices, 
police, customs, tax administration, intelligence and security organs, jails, as 
regards health and social funds, and concerning many other important functions; 
• The law allows for an accumulation of job postings; 
• The Republican Board for Preventing Conflicts of Interest is not professional; it 
does not set criteria for the election of its members - even education 
requirements do not exist; and the competences required are not defined (except 
as regards the three job positions for the Supreme Court). Members of the Board 
have other jobs in the private and public sectors and they make decisions ad hoc 
(i.e. they meet only from time to time, the Law does not say how often the Board 
should meet and according to what procedures, etc.) How they are elected also 
leads to questions, for the Supreme Court elects 3 members, the Bar Association 
1 and the National Parliament 5, at the suggestion of the Serbian Academy of 
Sciences and Art. All this gives SASA a de facto majority on the Board; 
VESNA PESIC: STATE CAPTURE AS THE CAUSE OF WIDESPREAD CORRUPTION 
 29
• The Law does not contain sanctions to deal with conflicts of interest. The Board 
can only give a non-public warning, with this being followed by a public 
recommendation that a law violator resigns if the non-public warning does not 
have any effect. The property of such a functionary will remain a public secret.  
 
 4. Regulatory Institutions, Laws and Anti-corruption 
Policies in Serbia: An Overview with Special 
Attention being given to the Law on the Financing of 
Political Parties 
From the point of view of ’state capture’, we will take a look at what Serbia has been 
doing to create independent regulatory institutions and to put into place anti-corruption 
policies; and we will investigate how far it has proceeded towards controlling the 
political/governing process and the powerful “political class“ - and towards reforming 
the economic process so as to reduce and eliminate monopolies and the special 
privileges of the business elite (tycoons) based on their political influence.   
If Serbia wishes to join the EU integration process, she must build up strong 
anti-corruption institutions whose target must be to improve the performance of the 
public sector in general - rather than just to reduce corruption per se. She needs to 
develop a professional and merit-based civil service as an important step in the 
long-term process of reducing corruption; she will have to establish a supreme and 
independent auditing institution to control budget expenditure and audit how taxpayers’ 
money is spent (this institution should control all public budgets, including that of the 
Serbian National Bank and also the managing of public money, public companies, 
political parties etc). She should establish a functioning Ombudsperson position and 
Anti-corruption commissions and agencies, and also build up a wide network of 
regulatory institutions and monitoring boards that can strengthen society’s capacity to 
prevent the unwarranted influence of state organs and political voluntarism. Effective 
legislative improvements are also needed with regard to A) free access to public 
information, B) the elimination of conflicts of interest (previously commented on), C) 
the promotion of free competition, D) the financing of political parties, E) regulations 
pertaining to the One Stop Shop concept, and so on. 
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Serbia has started to put into place the above-mentioned institutions, though its 
policies have not been clear or decisive - and the results are no more than modest. The 
supposed regulatory institutions that have been formed all have grave deficiencies due 
to distortions emanating from the degree of political influence. Because of the almost 
total political management of so-called independent agencies, it has even been 
suggested that it is better to overtly return their functions to the government in order to 
clarify who is really responsible. Anti-corruption measures have been arbitrary and 
rushed, using selective arrests58 and phony publicity; they have been ad hoc, having 
been created and then abandoned in the space of days. One indicative story refers to 
the forming of a specialized Anti-corruption Agency, which Serbia has an obligation to 
create according to international conventions (the UN and the Council of Europe) she 
has signed. The first draft for the specialist Anti-corruption Agency was created in 2002 
(with the cooperation of the OECD and the Council of Europe). Yet the present 
government has delayed the drafting of a Law defining how the Anti-corruption Agency 
will operate and what it should be responsible for. Only recently (October, 2006) did the 
public learn that the Government has actually come up with a relevant proposal – 
though the related law will not come into effect until at least October 1, 2007.  Amongst 
the responsibilities of this Agency will be control of the financing of political parties. 
 
 I will now give a brief overview of some of the Anti-corruption institutions and laws 
that do exist, giving special attention to the Law on the Financing of Political Parties 
because of its key role in being able to handle the phenomenon of state capture and 
the links between political party leaderships and the economic elite.  
 1) Almost nothing has been done to introduce professional requirements to 
connect with specific positions/appointments. An improvement was made in the state 
administration after the passing of the Law on State Administration (which came into 
effect in July, 2006). According to this Law, deputy ministers will be professionalized 
and positions will be advertised.  But, as always, the problem is implementation. 
Contrary to the declared intentions of the Law, the Government has begun organizing 
an almost total politicisation of staffing from the top to the lowest positions in the 
administration. The staffing initiative began when new elections were announced (for 
January 21, 2007). All of a sudden, in November 2006,59 a large number of 
advertisements for “deputy ministers” appeared in newspapers. The intention here was 
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to transform their party cadres into “professional civil servants” and to entrench them in 
the government administration after the elections. Along with this typically “political” 
way of implementation, the Law also has other deficiencies as it does not cover public 
servants in the police, customs, security, in the tax administration etc. Experts now say 
that there is no “political will” in the country’s politicians to give up party influence over 
state administration – for such a change can only happen if Serbia takes steps towards 
EU integration and applies the policies and procedures that are required for 
membership. 
 2) In 2005, Serbia passed the Law on the Institution for the State Audit, though 
such an Institution has not yet been created! Serbia is now the only country in the 
region that does not have a State Audit Institution. In public, the predominant opinion is 
that there is no readiness on the part of the Minister of Finance (and the government) 
to permit auditing control of any state institution, or of the national budget, financial 
statements coming from the Government and its ministries, local governments, public 
enterprises, political parties (etc.) In Serbia there are no well- qualified auditing 
companies (if EU standards are taken as the point of reference). The best persons that 
do exist, knowing that a state audit would be greatly exposed to political influence and 
lobbying, do not want to undergo the risks involved if competing for such a job60.  
 3) The Ombudsperson Law was passed, but no-one has yet been appointed to the 
position. In Vojvodina an “Advocate for Citizens” exists, and a similar position was 
recently created in the City of Belgrade - though on a national level the situation has 
remains stagnant. As is the case with other important institutions, the Ombudsperson 
has become a Constitutional category, which fact may help in its future functioning.  
 4) Anti-corruption agencies and commissions have not yet been formed although 
the National Anti-corruption Strategy was passed by Parliament in December, 2005. 
What still exists is the Anti-corruption Council, a body composed of civil society 
representatives, which was formed during the first transitional government and which 
will be dismissed since the new (aforementioned) Agency is to take its place. There are 
a couple of NGO organizations that try to deal with corruption. The most prominent and 
active of these is Transparency Serbia. 
 5) Regulatory institutions are being developed in Serbia though they are not 
independent of the executive or from political and business influences. Their lack of 
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independence has destroyed their reputations from the outset. Each institution has the 
same problem: they have been purposely designed by law not to function. The most 
scandalous case of ‘fixing’ the work of such an institution relates to the Republic 
Radio-diffusion Agency (RRA), and involved the “neutral” distribution of national 
frequencies to TV and radio stations. A whole book might be written about the 
scandalous operations of the RRA. Other less well-known examples include agencies 
dealing with competition policy and the ’Anti-monopoly Commission’.  
 Because of the domination of monopolies in Serbia (she has received the lowest 
grade – 1 - for competition policy)61, it has been said that Serbia does not have any 
competition policy. Most of the public companies are monopolies; private firms also 
seek out privileges in order to avoid having to indulge in market competition (most 
commonly, protection is gained by buying laws via connections in the government). To 
curb monopolies, a Law on the Protection of Competition was passed last year. An 
“Anti-monopoly Commission” was additionally established (after a long delay). The law 
will not be effective, however, owing to its deficiencies: it does not penalize market 
domination but only “misuse of one’s position on the basis of a reasonable and 
discretional estimation“. 
 6) The latest draft law on foreign investments included the concept of the One Stop 
Shop, and this is another example of the severe distortion of a good idea. The World 
Bank made serious remarks on how this law would open the door to corruption wide 
because of its deficiencies. In law, the One Stop Shop will be virtual – i.e. it will not be 
an actual office. Each municipality (there are almost 160 in all) will be a One Stop Shop. 
The actual ‘shop’ will simply be the discretional judgment of the mayor, or, for larger 
investments, the Economics Minister. The One Stop Shop may be at the service of an 
investor, or he can be deprived of it, depending on the discretional decision of the 
mayor or Minister, and disregarding what the law says. Discretional decision-making 
can only, it would seem, provide an open invitation to take on board pay-off requests. 
The Law on the Financing of Political Parties 
The Law was passed in 2003 but it did not meet up to expectations when it comes to 
preventing secret, under-the-table party financing - now a tradition in Serbia (since 
introduction of the multi-party system in Serbia in 1990). The government and parties 
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are supported by big capital contributions, and it is a well-known public ‘secret’ that 
tycoons finance all of the major parties. Individual donations are officially limited as 
regards the ‘regular’ functioning of a political party to 10 average salaries from 
individuals (per calendar year this amounts to 2,600 euros) and 100 average salaries 
for organizations (amounting to 25,000 euros). For election campaigns, the donations’ 
limit is determined in relation to the funds coming from the budget (around 350.000 
dinars, and 1.4 million dinars for an ongoing campaign). Each contribution must be 
recorded in the party’s accounts, and anonymous donations are forbidden. In practice, 
however, the Law is not adhered to, and the names of donors are not disclosed even 
though, by law, each donation over 100 dollars should be reported along with the name 
of the donor.  
What is needed is a transparent model concerned with financing parties and an 
efficient checking mechanism. Serbia must pass such a law; for there are many good 
practices that can easily be adopted and implemented.  Yet the ‘financing law’ will be 
useful only if Serbia passes a law on political party organization - which is currently 
lacking. The law now in effect is the old socialist law about ‘social-political 
organization’.  This law is certainly required because there are more than 400 parties in 
Serbia, and any serious intention to have controls here must start by clarifying what 
constitutes a political party and what the procedures for its creation and activities 
should be.  
The main problem of the existing Law is that it does not provide for the 
establishment of a separate institution to monitor the funding of parties, nor a separate 
body charged with supervision. There now exists two control bodies, ones that should 
not be connected with each other: the Republic Electoral Commission for campaigns, 
and the Parliamentary Board of Finance (to control regular party activities and 
financing). This (supposed) control body is made up of party members who will submit 
financial reports – which actually means that the parties end up controlling themselves. 
Although these organs can employ professional reviewers, they abstain from doing so 
- for two reasons: first, they lack the political will to really control party financing; and 
second, these two bodies (the REC and PBF) do not have a budget to pay such 
reviewers. In addition, the two bodies do not have any legal authority to start 
procedures against a party that does violate the law - they can only initiate a process 
that must then be taken over and dealt with by other organs. This, in practice, makes 
the control of parties via the law non-existent62. The law suffers from other deficiencies, 
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too - such as the stipulation that 20 percent of the money from the budget set aside for 
party financing should be distributed to parties at the beginning of any campaign, and 
80 percent at the end of the campaign (according to their degrees of success in the 
election). This means that parties will need to obtain money from other sources 
because they need money at the beginning of a campaign. Uncertainties about the 
Law and especially its weak implementation have paved the way for the undisciplined 
behaviour of political parties; the majority do not respect this law, and do not submit 
completed financial reports on time; and no parties have published their financial 
reports or made them available to the public (even though this is required by law). 
Despite the parties having avoided transparent financial dealings by taking 
advantage of the weak control mechanisms had by this law, they have nevertheless 
been able to get between 5 and 7 million euros a year (provided for by law) from the 
state budget; though there are many indications that politicians have systematically 
been creating ‘loops’ of companies via which they have acquired a lot of their money63. 
Under the same political influences the supposedly independent, regulatory institutions 
(commercial courts, enterprise registries, stock market and the media) have had to 
make compromises on their ability to control corruption. 
The delay of the government to form a specialized Anti-corruption Agency that 
would effectively control party financing (together with an Institution for State Auditing) 
means that the forthcoming elections can only occur under the existing - deficient - 
control mechanisms64.   
The preceding analysis confirms that Serbian Anti-corruption policies are weak and, 
as such, contribute to state capture and corruption. It also shows that if there is no 
political will to curb the corrupt state, no law will ever be good enough – i.e. the law may 
be perfect, though it will not function if there is no will for it to be implemented and 
enforced, or for it to actually work. 
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5. A Survey of Public Opinion about Corruption and 
State Capture 
Objective data relating to state capture has been analyzed as a ’framework’ to show 
that there is indeed ongoing, large-scale corruption. As regards anti-corruption policies 
it is essential, however, to know what citizens, as the principle stakeholders, actually 
think about mechanisms leading to and resulting in state capture - seeing how 
much they trust state institutions, how they assess “party“ job allocations for the public 
sector, what they think of the multi-functions of politicians and how they think 
corruption might be fought. 
I have divided the survey data associated with the public opinion of Serbian 
citizens into three sections: (1) public concerns about corruption and public confidence 
in the main state institutions and in party leaderships; (2) assessments of existing 
criteria for job allocations/leading positions in public office - and what criteria there 
should be, also looking at people’s approval/disapproval with regard to politicians’ 
having multi-functions (i.e. more than one job position);  (3) tolerance and awareness 
of corruption in public office, additionally noting what citizens think the most efficient 
strategy for fighting corruption in Serbia might be. 
Concerns about Corruption and Confidence in Institutions 
Serbia’s citizens think that corruption is one of the four most important issues that the 
country needs to handle. When people were asked to spontaneously choose the main 
problems Serbia is facing, responses were the following: unemployment (55%), low 
standards of living ((37%), Kosovo (23%), and corruption (28%)65. Major awareness of 
corruption has had a noteworthy effect on the degree of trust people have when it 
comes to the principal state institutions. Mistrust in such institutions and a perception of 
their being almost totally set apart from the interests of citizens are alarming 
phenomena. Answers given to a question of ‘which public institutions are working in 
the interests of citizens and for the general public good’ show that there is an extremely 
low amount of confidence had in these institutions: only 6% of persons think that 
political leaderships are working for the public good; Parliament gets only 8 percent 
affirmative answers, ministers get 9%, government 11%, the courts 12%, local 
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governments 15%, public companies 20% (etc.) All institutions receive a dramatically 
more negative ‘trust vote’ than positive (see Chart 3 below). 
 
For whose interests are these institutions and organizations working?  Using a 
scale of 1- 5, for each selected state office the results are extremely worrying. A great 
majority of people, 71%, think that state offices simply operate for themselves; 70% 
say that they work for their parties, 69% say they work for their relatives and friends - 
while the same amount think that they work for “powerful people and businessmen”. 
Only 13% said that state offices work in the interests of citizens! 
 In response to direct questions about the public organization or office in which 
corruption is most widespread (using a scale of 1-5 for each institution), 77% think that 
political parties are the most corrupted; tied second, with 75%, were doctors and MPs - 
and so on (see Chart 4). 
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Job Appointments for Public Office  
People have realistic perceptions regarding how positions in public offices are filled - 
thus confirming this author’s research data. When asked about how appointments 
should be made, the response was almost totally opposite to what went on in actual 
practice. Persons indicated that merit-based appointments should be the most 
important criteria used – more than 90% said that it should be the first criteria taken into 
account (Chart 6). A dramatically different picture was given about how they saw the 
actual reality of practice. People said that party membership and family/friendship ties 
are the most oft-used criteria (77% and 76%, Chart 5), while merit and qualifications 
play a much lesser role in any selection process. 
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Perceptions concerning recruitment procedures related to a job vacancy in public 
office show that 49% of persons think that advertisements for public office positions do 
not exist, and that the parties independently allocate these positions to their own 
people in the context of party coalition agreements. A total of 40% think that when 
positions are advertised, the competition is ‘fixed’ in advance; and only 8% percent of 
interviewees thought that public advertisements for positions - and an opportunity to 
apply – would be accessible to everyone.  
 The general public sees the holding of multiple functions by politicians to be a 
negative practice - thus a problem; and over 90% of the total sample of citizens held 
this point of view. Among responses regarding multiple functions, 27% said that this 
phenomenon was caused by a greed for money (i.e. seeking many sources of income); 
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24% explained that it is not possible to exercise so many functions/have so many posts 
and to perform them well and in the interests of the people; 20% estimated that multiple 
functions meant a concentration of power in a few hands only - which is not democratic; 
19% said that multiple functions give too much power to the parties. Only 9% said that 
having multiple functions/job positions is not a problem if someone is actually able to 
carry out all such functions and work effectively in one’s job positions.  
 People additionally disapprove of the practice that highly positioned 
statesmen/women have, simultaneously, active and high-level roles to play in their 
respective parties.  Fifty-four percent of the sample disapproved of the practice, 29% 
expressed their disapproval only with regard to its affecting the highest positions 
(Prime Minster, the President of Serbia, and ministers); 15% thought that having both 
an active party function and some form of state duty or duties would not influence a 
person’s effectiveness or performance in both such roles.  
Tolerance of Corruption in Public Office, and an Efficient Anti-corruption 
Strategy  
Serbians are sensitive to and will not tolerate corruption. Persons said that if they knew 
that a politician from the party s/he usually votes for was corrupt, s/he would go to the 
party to denounce him (34% of answers); while 33% would not vote (i.e. would abstain), 
22% would vote for another party, and 4% said that in spite of the corruption they would 
still vote for their party because the others are no better.  
 Other indicators again demonstrated great sensitivity to and non-tolerance of 
corruption. People claimed that they would immediately denounce someone who 
asked for a bribe (though my own personal opinion is that this is an overstatement - 
such denouncing would not really be carried out when someone was really faced with 
being bribed and had to make an assessment of the pros and cons involved). In 
response to a question about the relative corruption of political bodies (i.e. it is said that 
political corruption is the same in developed countries, though that did not prevent 
them from developing), 45% strongly disagreed with such a statement - while only 13% 
agreed (and others did not give an opinion). 
 Concerning the issue of why corruption is not being dealt with, 46% of research 
respondents expressed the view that the state is doing little to curb corruption because 
corruption is located within state organs themselves; while 21% felt that institutions 
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such as the courts, inspectorates and budget controlling mechanisms simply do and 
cannot work. A lesser number that said that there was no money to fight corruption, 
that political parties are not given enough support and that Serbian citizens are not 
supportive. 
 One question was: what do people think would be the most efficient policy via 
which to fight corruption?  Interviewees gave three main answers - and could mostly 
support why they had answered thus. First, special and independent bodies should be 
created to fight corruption as being something of major importance, indeed having a 
notoriety; second, the rule of law and independent courts must be strengthened; and, 
thirdly, internal and external controls need to be established for all public institutions - 
along with sanctions for those who violate the rules and set standards in the public 
sector.  A small amount (about 5% for each) mentioned the need to increase the 
involvement of all citizens, a need to prohibit multiple job positions/functions, the need 
to introduce obligatory standards of behaviour for all public servants, and the necessity 
of developing investigative journalism. 
 
Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
General Conclusions 
The complex transition process in Serbia still has its problems, ones that are specific 
and which have survived from the past. Among these problems is large-scale 
corruption, which has been a phenomenon in the country during the last six years 
(since Milosevic was ousted from power). In the post-Milosevic period, Serbia has 
passed many laws, and new institutions have been established to fight corruption. Yet 
the results are unsatisfactory, principally because the laws are deficient (or improperly 
implemented), institutions are weak and controlling mechanisms are almost 
non-existent. During the post-Milosevic period, there has been a tendency to accept 
the idea of state capture as the corrupted and non-transparent norm of public sector 
governance in Serbia. This trend has come via the growing stabilization of an 
oligarchic social structure and the loss of a strong pro-European and reformist policy 
orientation in government. Serbia has not yet established its own differentiating 
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outlines with which to separate the political and economic sectors. The high 
‘convertibility of influences’ existing between them has created a non-transparent and 
unaccountable government, one undermining the main state institutions, i.e. above all 
the Judiciary, Parliament and the principal regulatory and controlling institutions. This 
politically-dominated system has thus created a framework for systemic corruption.  
 Accompanying these typical  “transitional” problems are specific difficulties that 
Serbia has had when wishing to comply with international obligations related to the 
extradition of Ratko Mladic and other accused Serbs to the ICTY for their war crimes. 
The postponing of this obligation has held up negotiations with the EU in connection 
with the S&A agreement (with Serbia) – and this has curtailed, at least temporarily, EU 
influence on institution building in Serbia. The lack of “political will” as related to 
institution building in the area of judicial independence, professionalism, good 
governance and accountable executive organs has been clearly shown to us. An 
unrestrained political leadership in Serbia has, to a great extent, made the multi- party 
system into a rigid, party-feudal form of governance over public institutions and against 
citizens’ interests. Such a way of operating can be identified as the phenomenon of 
state capture, which works on a two-way track: it seizes state influence and all public 
institutions for political elite interests, and then trades them for the non-legitimate 
needs of privileged business (tycoons) in return for the latter’s secret financing (of 
parties).   
 To summarize, the results of this research dealing with state capture and the 
survey of public opinion have thrown light upon the following problems, and there is 
therefore a major need for policy options to deal with them:  
• Tycoons have become part of the system (government) by buying political 
influence, via which ensure and protect their monopolies (which keep prices 
higher66); they also have the benefit of favourable laws and various other 
privileges; 
• There has been an increase in discretional decision-making by ministers and the 
government; 
• The administration of tax, customs, police, services and utilities etc. has become 
highly politicized; 
• Multiple functions, an exaggeration of immunity, throwing MPs out of Parliament, 
a mingling of the highest party and state job postings/functions and an ownership 
of mandates by parties all point to the fact of an oligarchic political structure; 
• Political/party influence over the new regulatory institutions has become greater 
via there being a corrupting of their control mechanisms, related selection 
processes – or, simply, by delaying their establishment;  
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• Power has become concentrated within the executive branch, thereby enabling it 
to subjugate Parliament and the judiciary system to such a degree that there is no 
effective control mechanism over such a government67; 
• Citizens have lost their confidence in all public institutions and in politicians 
because of these state capture mechanisms i.e. with their imposing their own 
interests over those of the public. 
 
Policy Options and Recommendations  
The main policy problem is: how can legal limits and effective control be established 
over the currently-unrestrained party leaderships when it comes to their managing the 
public sector and the public’s interests? Related policy should lead to the creation of 
good governance institutions and a supportive legal environment, rather than merely 
focus on the negative consequences of the system’s malady.  To investigate what 
openings there may be, I will mention the positive elements of the changes that have 
occurred in the post-Milosevic era - and also point out public actors who might be able 
to implement new policies to curb state capture. Such positive elements in the area of 
policy change are:  
• Economic reforms have not been discontinued during these 6 years (though a 
short break did occur in 2004, especially regarding privatization), which still 
leaves the door open to the development of liberal, competitive markets and 
completion of the privatization process. Progress in this area will reduce 
excessive state interference in the economy, diminish the power of monopolies 
and businesses seeking “favours”, and will augment the shift towards a new style 
of entrepreneurship and corporate business based on the law and markets;   
• Political competitiveness has not been completely eliminated; there is still room 
for new political alternatives. There are important differences in the main political 
orientations of existing parties, so citizens do have an opportunity to vote for 
persons who are reformist and EU-oriented;68  
• In spite of certain negative moves from the government against NGOs, the latter 
are growing stronger, are increasing their leadership capacities and 
strengthening their potential for influence by forming coalitions and by engaging 
in joint activities; they are also working with new control institutions (such as the 
Ombudsman for Information).69 Investigative journalism is still in its infancy, but it 
has already produced some positive results70;   
• Institution-building and the development of a legal framework in the area of good 
governance is under way – and this needs to be continued, improved upon, 
implemented and also monitored; 
• Citizens’ awareness of corruption and state capture mechanisms is growing. 
They are the most important stakeholders and they need to establish alliances so 
as to combat extreme party/government power, so that more accountable and 
transparent governance can be established in Serbia. 
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 Based on the findings of the research and the positive tendencies that now exist as 
regards combating state capture, it is evident that if policy strategy is to be effective it 
needs to be carried out at three different policy levels, simultaneously. The first refers 
to the international level. Within the context of Serbia’s ambition to join the EU, the 
focal point must be to renew the suspended S&A negotiations with the EU. The 
condition for lifting the suspension should be Serbia’s full commitment to its 
international obligations by extraditing Mladic and others accused of war crimes to the 
ICTY. Without opening up and making clear progress on the road to EU integration, it is 
highly unlikely that notable results could occur at the second and the third levels of 
policy-making to thereby do away with the phenomena of state capture and systemic 
corruption. EU support with regard to wider political, economic and institution-building 
reforms is essential. The second policy cluster refers to the institutional and legal 
improvements that should be introduced in the area of fighting corruption in order to 
achieve the goal of attaining a grade 5 rating as measured by the TI CPI index – 
signifying a ‘bearable’ level of corruption. The third level of policy measures requires an 
activating of society, civic organizations, professional associations, the media and 
NGOs to a sufficient degree so that they can exert effective, systematic external 
pressure on the government, thereby eventually bringing about its accountability, 
transparency and a responsiveness to the needs and interests of the country’s 
citizens. 
 
At the first level of policy, i.e. breaking away from political stalemate that seeks to 
avoid Serbia’s international obligations, the following EU-related strategies can be 
recommended: 
• Actively supporting the pro-European democratic forces and the civil sector, to 
seek to marginalize the old nationalistic forces that are serve to anchor the state 
capture system and which represent anti-European values and institutions; 
• To urgently demand that the new Serbian Government, which will be formed after 
the forthcoming elections (January 2007), extradite Ratko Mladic and other 
accused Serbs to the ICTY so that negotiation processes with the EU can 
continue. Fulfilment of this obligation will give Serbia enormous potential to 
eradicate the secretive state bodies of the old regime existing in the police and 
military, which are the true stakeholders within state capture, nationalistic 
manipulation and anti-European policies;  
• To strongly support Serbia’s EU integration process, irrespective of the presently 
existing ambivalence regarding future EU enlargement. The integration process - 
in itself, with its insistence on political and economic reforms, free trade, and 
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institution building - is more important than the final goal of becoming a full 
member of the EU, although the goal has to remain tangible because of its 
motivational effects with regard to sustainable reforms and changes. 
  
Second-level polices take on board institution-building leading to good governance 
deriving from an analysis of state capture mechanisms and then looking at the 
consequences involved. The following policies are to be recommended:  
• Establishing, without delay, control mechanisms in all public and private sector 
areas where they are lacking. This will include implementation of already-existing 
laws. The State Audit Institution must be established and given real authority to 
audit all public budgets. The Agency to Fight Corruption, the Ombudsperson, and 
the Civil Service Agency additionally need to be set up and allowed to work. The 
latter is provided for by the State Administration Law. This, in turn, will promote 
professionalism and the complete de-politization of state administration at all 
levels and in all sectors, while requiring that all appointments be advertised and 
presented to the public;  
• Introducing an Ethics Code in all public institutions, especially giving weight to the 
ethical behaviour of MPs, government officials, judges, prosecutors, presidents 
of controlling boards of regulatory institutions etc. The purpose will be to raise 
consciousness as regards ethical standards and increase the effectiveness of the 
public sector. A permanent educating of public functionaries and civil servants in 
the domain of good governance should be introduced. Themes covered should 
include the prevention of conflicts of interests and obligations to inform the public 
about public interest issues and about the need for citizens and professionals to 
participate in the drafting of new legislation; 
• Eliminating the possibility of lobbying the government regarding customs taxes, 
petroleum excise taxes, transfers to municipalities, credits etc. – and eliminating 
the discretional decision-making of ministries and governments, instead basing 
such factors upon the rule of law; 
• Improving the already-existing laws and their regulatory bodies while adapting 
them to EU standards so that they will become more effective in their ability to 
control executive/political influences and where the latter’s collusion with private 
business can be prevented. In particular, the new Law on the Financing of 
Political Parties should be drawn up and submitted to Parliament, and an 
effective control body should be set up to deal with its implementation;  
• Advocating improvements in the Law on Conflicts of Interest - which was passed 
with many defects. It needs to take on board all functionaries, and it should 
prohibit MPs from having multiple public functions and government officials 
having multiple job positions; it also needs to professionalize the Board for the 
Prevention of Conflicts of Interest;  
• Improving competition policy, thereby eliminating monopolies and the gaining of 
privileges in the Serbian economy, via introducing more effective “anti-monopoly” 
control bodies; this can be done by expediting privatization procedures, by 
legislating free trade policies and by signing free-trade agreements;  
• Developing effective strategies with which to sell public company shares (not 
concerned with natural resources) in order to introduce responsible, efficient and 
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merit-based management instead of (as at present) party cronyism and 
nepotism.     
  
Third level policies come from presented survey data showing the dissatisfaction of 
citizens with public sector ineffectiveness and widespread corruption. They include: 
• Building up civil society’s capacities and promoting NGO alliances via which to 
organize public debates dealing with party-based distributions of leading 
positions in the public sector and discrimination on the basis of political 
conviction; 
• Organizing campaigns against multiple functions. Advocating the elimination of 
any mingling of state and party functions at the highest levels. Prohibiting the 
“feudal divisions” of executive power in the new government (one to be formed 
after new elections); 
• Initiating public dialogue with the more open-minded political parties about 
changes for election laws so as to strengthen the role of Parliament, increase the 
responsibility and professionalization of MPs, reduce the scope of their immunity, 
and to enhance citizen-MP relationships in relation to proposing, implementing 
and monitoring laws in the area of good governance, to thus prevent corruption;  
• Enhancing the capacities of investigative journalism and opening up public 
dialogue looking into state capture and good governance issues as well as ones 
relating to corruption. Supporting the journalistic profession in defence of 
freedom of expression. Advocating a real independence for the news media, TV 
and public radio services – thus, not allowing them to be an extended hand of the 
government; 
• Making alliances between independent regulatory bodies (agencies) and NGOs. 
Facilitating their joint roles as strategic partners with regard to fulfilling their social 
roles, which will include education provision and related training and their 
monitoring of the effectiveness of such new institutions.   
  
     Our research and survey data will hopefully serve to convince politicians and 
government officials to take into account public opinion and the almost total lack of 
trust that citizens have as far as political institutions and political leadership are 
concerned; for this is leading to an alarming alienation of citizens from the political 
system. Systematic and sustainable degrees of (external) influence coming from civic 
organizations and NGOs will be able to bring about the changes that are needed in 
leadership style in Serbia. 
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ANNEX I 
 Methodology 
•  Completion: research was conducted during the period July 20-24 2006.   
•  Population: Serbia (excluding Kosovo) 18+        
•  Sample size: 1027  
•  Sample type: A three-stage, random representative, stratified sample 
 
•  Primary stage units: Polling stations territories 
• Secondary stage units: Households (SRSWoR –  random walk) 
•  Tertiary stage units: Respondents within the household (Kish tables) 
• Research sites: 67 municipalities in Serbia, 127 local communities, urban, 
peripheral and rural neighbourhoods 
• Stratification: gender, age and region 
• Sampling error: 
±1.23% for incidence 5% 
±2.45% for incidence 25% 
±2.82% for incidence 50%  (marginal error) 
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Endnotes: 
 
[1] For more about this state capture concept, see Nemanja Nenadic: “Tycoons and Corruption”, in 
Politika, 12 November, 2006.  
 
 [2] The beginning of the transition in Serbia begins from the fall of the regime of Slobodan Miloseivc, 
October, 2000. 
 
 [3] After the assassination, the government remained the same - and only the Prime Minister was 
elected. It was Zoran Zivkovic, the Vice-President of the Democratic Party and Djindjic’s close 
collaborator.   
 
[4] This is not to say that there was much less corruption in Serbia during the first (Djindjic’s) government 
- it is to say that the first Government and its Ministers, as public institutions with the highest degree of 
influence, had not yet been captured by the party’s elite’s interests; nor were public appointments yet 
based exclusively on party criteria. Extreme appointment manipulation did not yet exist as a major link 
for appropriation of the public interest. The “party state” had not yet been created.  
 
 [5] Anti-corruption in Transition 3, Who is Succeeding…and Why? Authors: James H. Anderson & 
Cheryl W. Gray, WB, 2006 
 
 [6] This research has shows one positive trend: there was a reduction in the percentage of profit given 
as bribes. It was reported that this was due to smaller amounts being asked for bribery. Although the 
number of requests is larger, the total amount of corruption was lower.  
 
 [7] I am looking at only two governments after Milosevic: Djindjic’s, and that of Kostunica. Some people 
refer to three governments, so include the Zivkovic government as a separate one. Since Zivkovic, as 
Prime Minister, did not change the Djindjic government from a personnel point of view, nor did he 
introduce any changes in policy - and since it only lasted from March to November 2003, I have not 
treated it separately. 
 
 [8] For the Serbian public, the assassination of Zoran Djindjic was understood to be a form of resistance 
by old cadres in security institutions to his intentions to modernize Serbia and make the country ready to 
join the EU as soon as possible. His cooperation with the Hague Tribunal in relation to war crimes was 
part of his threat to reform the military and secret police and bring in new administrative personnel. 
 
 [9] The Democratic Party of Serbia (DPS), whose president is Vojislav Kostunica, and who is presently 
Prime Minister of Serbia, and ex-President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.   
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 [10] This proves that the EU has stopped negotiations with Serbia about the S&A agreement because of 
the lack of political will to extradite Ratko Mladic and others accused of war crimes to the ICTY.  
 
 [11] The Law on the Prevention of Conflicts of Interest was passed in April, 2004; The Law on Free 
Access to Information in November 2004, The Law on the State Auditing Institution at the end of 
2005; The Law on the Protection of Competition - the “Anti-Monopoly law” – in September, 2005; while 
the Ombudsman Law and the Anti-corruption Strategy was passed by Parliament in December, 2005. 
 
 [12] Ex-minister of Finance, Bozidar Djelic, says that the new wave of politization of public 
institutions has led to a unilateral increase in discretional decision-making by the Government (being 
unsupported by law or Parliamentary decision-making) regarding different types of taxes (excise taxes 
on petroleum, customs tariffs, etc.). These were previously regulated by law. See: Kada cemo ziveti 
bolje (When We Shall Live Better), Sluzbeni Glasnik at al., Belgrade, 2006.  
 
 [13] After considerable pressure by the International Monetary Fund to begin the process of 
privatization of public companies, the Serbian Government strategy aims to partially privatize the 
Serbian Petroleum Industry (Naftna industrija Srbije – NIS), which will take place some time in 2007.   
 
 [14] Research looking at the origin of the present-day economic elite indicates that it has been recruited 
from ex-socialist companies, beginning in 1989. Their former directors, experts and managers, once 
part of the nomenclature, are the ‘tycoons’ of today. Mladen Lazic, “Recruitment of the New Economic 
and Political Elites”, Republika,, June 2006.  
http://www.policy.hu/vpesic/final_version_policy_paper.html - _ednref15 
 
[15] The whole case, in detail, was presented and published by the Council Against Corruption of the 
Government of the Republic of Serbia, in Serbian and English: Corruption, Power, State, Part two, by 
Verica Barac and Ivan Zlatic, Res Republika,  Belgrade, 2005.  
 
[16] For a description of the corruption affairs, see Okupacija u 26 meseci 2004-2006 (Occupation in 26 
Months, 2004-2006). Centar za Modernu politiku (Centres for Modern Politics), Belgrade, 2006.  
 
[17] The four parties are: the Democratic Party of Serbia (DPS) of Vojislav Kostunica, the Democratic 
Party (DP) of Boris Tadic, who is also President of Serbia, the Serbian Radical Party (SRP) of Vojislav 
Seselj (which is the biggest individual party in the Parliament), and Mladjan Dinkic’s G17+, presently 
Minister of Finance.  
 
[18] The official justification for such a hasty adoption of the new Constitution was to “keep Kosovo within 
Serbia” by saying in the Constitution that Kosovo is a part of Serbia. 
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[19] The president of Transparency Serbia, Vladimir Goati, said that Article 102 of the new Constitution 
(which gave mandates to the parties) singled out Serbia as the only European country to have such a 
law. This type of rule only exists in some Asian countries (e.g. Bangladesh, Pakistan, India).  
 
[20] The mandate of the Governor of the NBS does not coincide with elections or changes in the 
Parliament or Government. The same goes for the Ombudsman for Information, whose work became 
influential and well appreciated by the public. The impression is that somebody from the Government 
asked for his removal because he performed his public role in a proper and independent way (e.g. he 
caught the Minister of Police lying).  
 
[21] To protect the parties’ interest in keeping control of the Serbian Parliament’s mandates, the three 
main parties (the DPS of Kostunica, DP of Tadic, and the SRP of Seselj/Nikolic) decided to ‘disengage’ 
the sovereignty of the people by giving the ownership of all mandates to parties. The real user of 
sovereignty (which should stem from the people) will be the parties’ leaderships, enabling them to 
exercise state authority, if not directly, then indirectly via owning MPs’ mandates.  See:  Aleksandar 
Molnar, Republika, October 24, 2006, page, XXII, XXII. 
 
[22] In a recent Interview, the former vice-president of the Serbian Government, Miroljub Labus, said 
that “the tycoons cooperate perfectly with all parties – from the Radicals to the Democratic Party of 
Serbia; they have become part of the system”. Daily Danas, 11-12 November, 2006.  
 
[23] Given the current constellation of political forces and the proportional election system, no party can 
win a majority. Therefore, coalitions are formed at all levels of authority.  At the local government level, 
coalitions are broader and their clashes over divisions of power are the cause of constant 
de-compositions or breakdowns of local governments.  
 
[24] For instance, the Capital Investments Minister publicly admitted that the public company “Serbia 
Railways”, which is under the control of his party (the director of the company is from his party) had not 
respected the procurement procedure when buying Swedish railway carriages. In spite of the 
admittance, there were no consequences for anybody because if the Minister and the Director of the 
public company were to have been made responsible and subject to legal proceedings it could have 
prompted the withdrawal of support to the government of his MPs' - and the Government would have 
fallen. The person who disclosed the irregularities was dismissed from his post. The Finance Minister 
found himself in a similar situation when the case of the National Saving Banks was once again opened 
to the public. This connected the Minister with corruption. The accusations against the Minister were 
disclosed on a TV show by the President of the Anti-corruption Council of the Government of Serbia, 
Verica Barac - yet to no avail, as the same protection mechanism was applied.   
 
[25] Implementation of the new Law on State Administration occurred in July, 2006. Along with the many 
problems involved in its application and the usual deficiencies of the law itself, it was reported that many 
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adverts began to appear in newspapers as regards positions open for deputy ministers. See: Ana 
Trbovic, Blic (daily newspapers), November 25, 2006. 
 
[26] Only 3 parties (there are about 39 active parties and a total of more than 400 registered parties) 
submitted on time their complete annual financial and activity report to the Financial Board of the 
Assembly. This shows that parties do not respect obligations as established by law. For greater details 
see: Vladimir Goati, Partijske borbe u Srbiji  u postoktobarskom razdoblju (Struggles among Parties in 
Serbia in the Post-October Period), Fridrich Ebert Shiftung,  Belgrade,2006, pp. 179-204. 
 
[27] The source for determining the number of schools in Central Serbia: Statistical Year Book of 
Yugoslavia, 2000. Bozidar Djelic reported that there are 3960 primary schools and 577 secondary 
schools (the total for Serbia), Kada cemo ziveti bolje, Belgrade, 2006. 
 
[28] The DPS (Democratic Party of Serbia) president is Vojislav Kostunica, who is also the Prime 
minister; G17+ president Mladjan Dinkic is Minister of Finance; SRM (the Serbian Renewal Movement 
of Vuk Draskovic, President of the Party, is Minister of Foreign Affairs, while NS (New Serbia), President 
Velimir Ilic is Minister for Capital Investments. The government, thus composed, still did not get a 
majority in Parliament and, as a minority government, it has to be supported by the SPS (Slobodan 
Milosevic’s Socialist Party of Serbia, now led by Ivica Dacic).   
 
[29] The first post-Miloševic government comprised 18 parties, though it avoided the 'feudal' dividing of 
portfolios. The first government (2001-2003) came in two parts: one composed of experts and non-party 
personalities who got their positions on merit - and the second was political, being composed of 
numerous political leaders of the parties who participated in the grand coalition against the Milosevic 
regime, and were given positions such as Deputy Prime Minister.  The composition of each ministry was 
a mixture of different parties, so effective control was achieved even without strong or rigid institutional 
rules for means of control.  
 
[30] This coalition does not exist any more. After the ruling coalition was formed, some parties and 
coalitions split. Details about the consequences of these new divisions for the pubic sector are not 
provided.  
 http://www.policy.hu/vpesic/final_version_policy_paper.html 
 
[31] The Intelligence Service was used, last year, to spy on MPs to see their intentions as regards voting 
for the 2006 Budget. Two people were expelled from Parliament overnight because they said that they 
would not vote in favour of the Budget.   
 
[32] The non-transparent approval of credits to farmers by the Ministry of Agriculture was denounced 
most often in public by the Radicals, as farmers are their main constituency.  
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[33] Data about both ministries and their party appointments have been obtained with the help of 
journalists and ‘insiders’ who are previous or present holders of high senior positions in the Ministries.  
  
[34] Since October, 2000, Serbia has gone through three National Bank governors. The first Governor 
was Mr. Dinkic, at present Minister of Finance; the second was a non-party expert appointed to replace 
Mr. Dinkic because he, as a vice-president of the G17, was involved in partisan politics; the 
third  governor of the NBS was a candidate  from the ranks of G17+ when this party became a member 
of the ruling coalition.   
 
[35] For example, the Director of the Tax Administration of Serbia was a member of G17+; advancing 
politically, he became a member of the G17+ Executive Board; recently, he was transferred to the 
position of State Secretary in the Ministry of Finance, while his position in the Tax Administration was 
given to another member of the same party.  
 
[36] Ex-Minister of Finance, Bozidar Djelic, in his recently published book said that he was under 
pressure from the local party boards of the DOS coalition, who “suggested” to him who the Tax 
Administration heads might be. He complained that he became very unpopular among DOS local 
activists because he refused to let them choose Tax Administration personnel. However, he estimates 
that during the last two years the situation has changed - in the opposite direction; some people without 
professional references have received positions in the Tax Administration, while some with established 
professional reputations have lost their positions at the request of local party boards or because there 
were doubts about their “party loyalty”.  
 
[37] Two Parties in the first government, The Civic Alliance of Serbia (CAS) and the Democratic Centres 
(DC), are small, liberal parties with many professionals and experts in them. Both joined the grand 
coalition against Milosevic. 
 
[38] One Parliamentary MP said that we are able to talk about “the terror of government and politics over 
professionalism and qualifications in state administration”.  
 
[39] One candidate for school director in the city of Nis was threatened with death if she did not withdraw 
her candidacy. She was a victim of political revenge – something that has occurred all over Serbia. It 
was said that in all institutions and procedures, political pressures are the norm.   
 
[40] The most striking case when the school’s own choice for director won was in the Economic 
(secondary) School in Cacak.  
 
[41] The case refers to the selection of heads of libraries, which the Republic of Serbia had founded, and 
whose appointments are given to the Ministry of Culture. Library heads in the cities of Nis and Jagodina 
have been appointed according to the party criteria of the Minister. This caused a major public outcry. 
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Candidates with better qualifications for the job threatened to appeal to the International Labor 
Organization for protection under the equal access to jobs/functions requirement. Via personal contacts, 
I learned that in many cases ministers are informed by local party boards as to who the favourite in any 
competition should be.   
 
[42] The Police Minister has replaced all 16 Police District Heads and, in total, he has replaced about 
700 senior policemen since he took over office. There is no audit or supervision of budget spending 
concerning the Police, nor civilian control of the police and intelligence. Police procurements are a “state 
secret“, i.e. are exempt from monitoring.   
 
[43] “Public companies” in Serbia are companies that manage “public utilities” in different sectors, such 
as energy, transportation, telecommunications and natural resources. They are very big and are often 
monopolies. The Government of Serbia appoints their management boards. In each municipality or city 
there are public utilities whose management is appointed by the local government.  
 
[44] Data about public companies is taken from articles published in July, 2006 issues of the Belgrade 
daily Danas.  
 
[45] Politika is the oldest and the most influential of Serbian newspapers. Traditionally, it is controlled by 
the government. At present, half of it is owned by the German company Vac and half by smaller 
domestic share holders. In order to help the papers pay off its debt (6 million euros) and to retain control 
of 50 percent of shareholder equity, the Electric Company Electro-Distribution invested money in it - and 
became a 14% owner of Politika. 
 
[46] The first thing that Kostunica’s Government did was to illegally appoint a new director for State 
TV.  Citizens are required by law to pay for this TV service, together with their electricity bill, although the 
RTS is not really an independent public service - as it is controlled by the government and the ruling 
parties.  
 
[47] Justification for the dismissal was that an editorial written about Ratko Mladic was not a ‘local topic’. 
It should be mentioned that the newspapers were very successful financially and were widely read by 
the people of Zrenjanin. 
 
[48] Although the Commissar for the Free Access to Information reacted - and requested that the 
companies respond as required by law - there has been no answer up to now.   
 
[49] Under pressure from the IMF, the Serbian Government hired a foreign privatization advisor to assist 
in the privatization of Naftna industrija Srbija (NIS) – the Serbian Petrol Industry – which is one of the 
largest public companies here. Despite paying for strategy advice as regards the privatization procedure, 
the government secretly held negotiations with the Russian company (“Rosnjeft”) in order to avoid a 
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having to publicly announce a tender. The secret negotiations were held during the last two months of 
2006 although privatization was planned to start at the beginning of 2007. Daily newspaper Danas, 6-7 
January, 2007.  
http://www.policy.hu/vpesic/final_version_policy_paper.html  
 
[50] The League of Social-Democrats of Vojvodina. 
 
[51] No exact number is available as to how many appointed positions (jobs) there are in the city of Novi 
Sad. There are only different estimations, varying from 500 to 1000 posts.  
  
[52] I will not present in this paper the multiple functions of Government officials; they can be seen in the 
Policy Documentation Centres where I posted my published article dealing with the topic: http://pdc.hu  
 
[53] Vladimir Goati, Politicke borbe u Srbiji u postoktobarskom razdoblju, op. cit. pp. 108-109.  Goati 
shows the changing practices within parties’ control over mandates in the Serbian Parliament during the 
15-year time-span of the multi-party system.   
 
[54] Two MPs of the G17+ said that they would not vote for the 2006 state budget just before the vote 
was about taken on it in the Parliament. They were excluded from the Parliament the very next day, via 
illegal activation of their “blank resignations”.   
 
[55] See more about the misdoings of the Administrative Board and the illegal usage of “blank 
resignations” in Goati, op. cit, pp. 109-110.  With regard to the government’s methods for creating its 
majorities, Goati concludes that it has “mutated from government de jure into government de facto, and 
this has maintained its position via usurpation”.   
 
[56] This is the case of the president of the Vojvodina Government, who is at the same time an MP, a 
vice-president of the Democratic party and a member of the Fund for Development. 
 
[57] It was denied in public that a politician who is directly elected can hold another public office at the 
same time, referring to the widespread practice of city mayors simultaneously holding an MP position. 
See Nemanja Nenadic (Transparentnost – Srbija): “Sprecavanje i razresavanje sukoba javnog i 
privatnog interesa” (“Preventing and Resolving Conflicts between the Public and Private Interest”), in 
Konflit interesa kod javnih funkcionera i javnih sluzbenika u Srbiji (Conflicts of Interest of Public 
Functionaries and Public officers), Transparentnost – Srbija, 2006 pp.  89- 106 
 
[58] In an interview with one MP (a well-informed person) the following accusation was made during a 
Parliamentary session that was urgently called to strip the immunity of the State Prosecutor who had just 
been arrested: “The session was called because one businessman ordered the government to arrest all 
of his rivals.  This businessman gave them a lot of money. This supposed justification for stripping the 
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Prosecutor’s immunity was more than ridiculous - the real reason was that he had prevented Merkator 
from buying up C market. I will leave it to the reader to guess the name of the businessman who was 
bothered by the decision of the Prosecutor. This comment was made during the interview: “He gives 
them (to the ruling parties in the government) so much money that he can order them to do as he 
wants”.  Skupstinska mreza, October 2006, address: 
 http://www.skupstinskamreza.org.yu/index.php?ID=9&itemTypeID=31&contentID=2 
 
[59] ‘An unusual haste’ was reported in the press. Crowds lined up in the ministries. There was a desire 
by the ruling parties to keep their political appointees in government, as if they were professionals. In 
great haste, exams for civil servants (professional status) were organized, and passing grades were 
required if persons wished to retain the positions held up to then. It was reported that some parties 
sought revenge against others, so that the other parties’ ‘people’ would not pass these exams. It was 
also reported that some people with a secondary-level education only pass such an exam - while others, 
with a PhD, fail!  Blic, daily newspaper, December 19, 2006. 
 
[60] Ljubisa Stanojevic, professor for accounting and auditing, in Politika, November 20, 2006. 
  
[61] According to the Transitional Report of the EBRD for 2005; only two ex-communist countries - 
Turkmenistan and Bosnia and Herzegovina - got such a low rating.  
 
[62] A monitoring of the presidential campaign in 2004 showed that all candidates spent more money 
than was permitted, though nothing happened and no sanctions took place. To learn more about the 
problems of the controlling mechanisms set up by law, see the excellent monograph: Vladimir Goati, 
Nemanja Nenadic, Predrag Jovanovic: Finansiranje predsednicke izborne kampanja 2004 u Srbiji 
(Financing the Presidential Election Campaign, 2004, in Serbia), Transparentnost - Srbija, 2004.  
 
[63] Detailed reports about such cases were submitted to the Government by the Anti-Corruption 
Council, though they have never been reviewed.  
 
[64] A new form was created by Transparency Serbia for use when reporting money-collecting and 
spending within the context of the January 2007 elections. Clearer and more open reports should be 
submitted 10 days after elections have been held.  
 
[65] The higher degree of concern about corruption than about Kosovo was due to the ongoing 
corruption cases being aired in public at the time of the survey… Other survey data, however, shows 
that concerns about Kosovo are higher than about corruption – though this does not change the fact that 
corruption is among the four biggest problems being faced in Serbia.  
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[66] Daily paper Politika carried out an experiment comparing basic food prices in the Czech Republic 
with those of Serbia: the conclusion was that in Serbia the prices are almost twice as high, due to the 
existence of monopolies.  
 
[67] For just this reason, the President of the Anti-corruption Council, Verica Barac, in her last 
announcement said that the government had become “the centre of power and corruption”, quoted from 
Republika, December, 2006. 
 
[68] As has been shown, there is a notable difference between the way the Democratic Party and the 
Democratic party of Serbia would lead the government, although they are both considered to be part of 
the “democratic bloc”.  
 
[69] Some NGOs protested against the replacement of the Ombudsman for Information during the first 
session of the new Parliament, for they had cooperated very fruitfully with the Ombudsman on several 
occasions. 
 
 [70] The TV show “Insider” (on the B 92 TV station) is such a case. It has revealed all kinds of misdeeds 
coming from the government, especially in the area of police activities, security agencies, the courts and 
prosecution cases, as well as tycoons avoiding customs, cigarette smuggling, etc.  
 
